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How Chongqing People View Bo Xilai 
May 1, 2012 in Uncategorized by The China Beat 
By Xujun Eberlein 
One April day in my birth city of Chongqing, I encountered a rare quarrel in People’s Park. The 
park is one of several places in downtown Chongqing that offer low-cost “baba cha” (open-space 
tea), where retirees and others with time on their hands lounge under leafy banyan trees with 
their teacups and bird cages for a good part of the day. Two fiftyish men sat at a plastic table 
drinking tea and chatting about Bo Xilai, their city’s ousted leader. One of the men said that Bo’s 
promotion of “people’s livelihood” had been a fake show, because during his four-year rule, 
prices of meat, food, and other daily goods had risen steeply in Chongqing. Two young women, 
who happened to be nearby, cellphones in hand and apparently waiting for someone, did not like 
what they heard and started to argue that Bo made Chongqing better. The man got very upset; his 
face reddened and he raised his voice, which attracted the attention of onlookers, including me. I 
asked the man whether his criticism was formed after Bo’s downfall. He was insulted. “This has 
always been my opinion! I’m not brainless, I was once a journalist!” he yelled. 
 
Tea-drinkers in People's Park, Chongqing 
This scene is rare because, seemingly illogically, in the weeks since his downfall, Bo’s local 
dissenters have been much quieter than his supporters. 
Chongqing people’s attitudes toward Bo Xilai range from supportive to condemnatory to “who 
cares” and everything in between, a broad spectrum with two heavy ends. (For the indifferent, a 
typical expression I often heard was “The gods fighting is none of our business.”) So far, 
however, foreign journalists seem to have a hard time penetrating the famous fog of the river-
mountain city to find more than one stratum of views. In the English media it is easy to see 
headlines such as “Bo Xilai Still Admired Locally in China” and “Bo Xilai Remains Popular in 
Megacity He Once Oversaw.” In those reports quoting “the average people on the street,” the 
term “average people” generally does not include intellectuals, writers, journalists, academics, 
and so forth. 
In fact, among local intellectuals, professionals, and the middle class, there has been an 
overwhelming sentiment against Bo’s doings in Chongqing since 2009, according to a dozen 
such men and women I have spoken to this month, all of whom requested anonymity. One reason 
their opinions have not been widely reflected in the foreign media is that they are much more 
reluctant to speak than the “stick men” (棒棒, or porters-for-hire) who roam the streets. When I 
asked why they were still afraid of speaking up even after Bo was gone, a local journalist told me 
that the government had issued orders forbidding them from talking to foreign journalists. 
There is a long tradition in China of intellectuals being more tightly controlled than any other 
social class. Their present silence reflects a deep distrust of the government regardless of its 
position. Though Bo is now officially on the outs, it is still safer not to voice one’s opinions. 
A researcher of Chongqing’s Cultural Revolution told me that in early April, within two hours of 
talking on the phone with the Chinese assistant of a British journalist and agreeing to have an 
interview about Bo and the Cultural Revolution, two policemen paid him a visit and requested he 
cancel the interview, on the grounds that it was a sensitive time and speaking to foreign media 
would damage Chongqing’s image. After turning them down, he was visited by two old ladies 
representing the “neighborhood committee,” who presented the same request. The next day his 
boss at his work unit talked with him—again urging him to cancel the interview. He wondered 
how the government found out about the interview and whose phone was monitored: his or the 
journalist’s. To their credit, the researcher told me, all of his uninvited visitors were polite. “At 
least that is progress.” 
The local scholars I spoke to view Bo as either a hypocritical opportunist or a ruthless 
megalomaniac who regards himself as the savior of China, in either case pursuing his own 
agenda by fair means or foul. Their condemnation of Bo comes down to the bottom line that the 
system Bo delivered put the ruler’s authority above the law. The billion-dollar gingko trees, 
expensive police platforms, and subsidized housing that pleased many were all parts of his “face 
engineering.” My interviewees pointed out that every district of Chongqing is now facing 
bankruptcy. 
Bo’s supporters can be most easily found among housewives, retired workers, “stick men,” and 
taxi drivers. One reason that many in the lower-income or laboring classes advocate for Bo is 
that Bo’s violence did not touch them, a university professor said; instead they received small 
benefits, for which they are grateful. “The poor don’t know that Bo looks down on them in his 
bones,” the aforementioned Chongqing journalist said. He gave me an example that once, people 
in a poor neighborhood unexpectedly saw their benefactor inspecting the area, and they ran to 
him to express their thanks, only to be pushed back by Bo’s guards. Bo simply turned his back, 
pretending not to see them. 
“Chongqing people are very vain,” a local writer told me, giving another explanation for Bo’s 
popularity. “What made them most happy about Bo is that he dressed the city up with trees and 
made Chongqing famous. They don’t care what system is behind all this. They don’t care how 
much the government is spending. Their logic is that since I don’t get to use the money anyway, 
it is better to waste it on expensive gingko trees than drop it in the pockets of corrupt officials.” 
Several scholars have pointed out that Bo drew on a common sentiment among lower-income 
people today: hatred of the rich, hatred of corrupt officials. Bo satisfied them by killing or 
punishing some of those people; how he did it or whether anyone was wronged does not matter. 
The scholars I talked with are not rich—they do not even qualify as middle class according to the 
commonly accepted definition of “a house and a car.” But they have better access to information 
than many people who only see Bo’s propaganda—for example, the “five Chongqing” posters, 
which were still pervasive in the city during my April visit. 
One day during my trip, a middle-aged women sitting behind me in a shared van was talking to 
another woman about how the police platforms along Chongqing’s streets have made the city 
much safer—a commonly heard praise of Bo—and how criminals would return now that Bo was 
gone. I asked what she thought about singing red songs. “Those songs purify people’s souls,” she 
answered, as if picking a sentence right from a Party newspaper. “Would you like to go back to 
the Mao era, then?” I continued to ask. “The Mao era was better than now,” she said, “at least 
poor patients would be accepted and rescued at an emergency room! Nowadays no one cares if 
you don’t have money.” “But what about the millions of people who starved to death in the great 
famine?” I had to ask. She replied, “That was a natural disaster!” (The woman is not alone on 
this—many ordinary people in China are still unaware that the great famine that lasted three 
years from 1959 to 1961 was mainly caused by Mao’s erroneous policies.) 
Other fierce advocates of Bo come from the “CCP (Maoist)” group, a small local organization 
with no more than two or three dozen members—all retired factory workers. They “elected” Bo 
Xilai (whose consent was not required) as their “general secretary” in an October 2009 
conference at which a number of participants were detained by Bo’s government. After Bo’s 
downfall in mid-March of this year, a handful (exaggerated by internet rumors to thousands) of 
“CCP (Maoist)” members held a protest at Chongqing’s riverfront Chaotianmen. A local 
observer familiar with the incident said that group had tried unsuccessfully to mobilize ex-Red 
Guards who had suffered imprisonment and other punishment for their activities during the 
Cultural Revolution. Those past “heroes,” who remain excluded from China’s economic miracle 
and live in poverty, were disappointed in Bo Xilai after their open letter asking to improve their 
living condition was ignored. 
Bo’s supporters and dissenters all believe their side is in the majority, and each side uses very 
different logic when interpreting the charges against Bo and his wife. Four out of five taxi 
drivers I spoke to, for example, said they didn’t believe that Gu Kailai had murdered Neil 
Heywood or that Bo was corrupt and hiding money overseas. “Think about it,” one driver said in 
a teaching tone. “Gu Kailai is a very smart lawyer, wouldn’t she know the consequences of 
murder? Bo Xilai’s interest is in politics, would he care about a few bucks? It is just that 
simple!” Their interpretation is that all the charges are made-up excuses to bring Bo down 
because Bo is more capable than Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Xi Jinping. The dissenters, on the 
other hand, believe Bo is completely capable of murder because he has no regard for the life of 
someone standing in his way. Curiously, regardless of their stance on the Bo affair, most of those 
I spoke to suspected that Wang Lijun’s entry into the US consulate was part of a plot to bring Bo 
down. 
The last thing I heard before leaving Chongqing was that Bo has requested a public trial. If this is 
true, the request is most ironic: Bo himself put numerous people on “public trial” during his 
“crackdown on gangsters” campaign in 2009-2010 and no witnesses for the defense were 
allowed in court. A dozen or so of those arrested were hastily executed as results of such trials. 
In a country without an independent judiciary, there is no reason to expect Bo’s prosecution 
would be any more evenhanded, and Bo should know this better than anyone. So an interesting 
question is what his real motive in asking for a “public trial” would be. Presumably, it indicates 
his extreme self-confidence, a characteristic that has done him much damage to date. 
On the other hand, the Party leaders must have known that given the wide divide in public 
opinion, an open trial would put the Party in hot water. That is probably why Bo has only been 
charged with a discipline violation, an offense that can be handled completely within the Party. 
The public divide reflects two sides of the same coin; it is a social crisis caused by rapid 
economic development ill-supported by the country’s political system. The purge of Bo Xilai 
puts China’s ruler—the Communist Party—to another legitimacy test. It will be most interesting 
to see how the Party comes out of it. 
Xujun Eberlein is the author of an award-winning story collection, Apologies Forthcoming, and 
the blog Inside-Out China. 
 
